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MANSFIELD SAYS JAPANESE MARKET NOT CLOSED,
SUGGESTS THAT U.S. EXAMll'ffi OWN TRADE BARRIERS
TOKYO -- (By a BNA Special Correspondent) -- In spite of recent statements by Reagan
Administration officials complaining that the Japanese market is still too closed to imports,
U.S. Ambassador Michael Mansfield said recently that the market here is not as closed as it
is being portrayed, and that the U.S. market is not as open to foreign imports as commonly
believed.
In an exclusive interview with BNA, Mansfield said the United States should consider
removing some of its own trade barriers. "I think the Japanese market is more open than we
realize and ours is not as open as we think," he said. "It's true that there are invisible barriers, since quotas are still maintained, mostly on agricultural products ••• but the U.S.
market is not as open as some of us think because we've entered into orderly marketing agreements which tend to cut off shipments to an extent or to realign them in such a way that they
must conform to our standards." He cited in particular textiles, color TVs, steel and automobiles.

He agreed that U.S. trade barriers should be "gone into very seriously" and rP.moved
"unless overriding reasons are forthcoming."
· Japan Trade "Most Important"
Despite the Japanese quotas on agricultura l products, Mansfield defended the trade relationship with Japan -- calling it "the most important bilateral relationship in the world" -and cited figures that orange and juice imports rose five times in the past four years. He
said he expected it to continue to rise further this year.
During a recent press briefing, one ministry of foreign affairs official complained that
criticisms by U.S. government officials about Japan's "closed" market were not constructive.
He noted that while the United States is complaining about quotas on oranges, the United States
also has limits on Japanese mikans imported into the United States.
Mansfield agreed, saying, "The American orange industry has some complaints that
ought to be gone into, and if the necessary corrections can be made, we should create the
possibility of an expanded mikan market."
Mansfield denied that the current round of public comments about Japan's markets
amounted to increased pressure on Japan or to an attempt to convince the American public that
Japan is responsible for U.S, trade problems.
Mansfield a !so denied that U.S. pressure was responsible for the Suzuki cabinet and
Ministry of International Trade and Industry recent announcements of policies to step up im[X)rtS of manufactured goods into Japan, although he admitted that the United States made
"suggestions" and had "talks" about the issue.
That policy, believed to stem from recent criticism especially by the European Community countries of} apan's trade surplus, the government said, would include reductions of
some tariffs, investment and technology exchanges, and a method for adjusting the trade flow
to and from Japan. MITI said it will attempt to talk with various other ministries, such as
Finance and Agriculture before setting its policy later this fall for the upcoming GA TI conference.
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Pr otectionism from Auto Agreement
Mansfield also said that the recent auto restraint agreement indicates a general tendency toward protectionism in the West, although he was quick to add that it is only "latent"
in the United States, so far . He said one of his main jobs, therefore, is to foresee future
economics difficulties and "do what we can to prevent it from getting out of hand and becoming an impossible political issue in which protectionist legislation would play a very important part. " He said he definitely sees the possibility for future trade friction concerning
semiconductors, high technology, and computers. "We have to expect it," he said. But he
also warned that American business in these areas, especially semiconductors, must make
an effort to stay ahead of the game. "We can take nothing for granted, and we've got to
spend enough on research and development to make sure that lead is maintained , " he said,
He also said that the industry reaction in the auto trade talks shows more resistance
to voluntary restraints on exports. "The Japanese industry in that respect is beginmng to
compare somewhat with ours • o . they don't depend on the government nearly as much as they
used to for financing, guidance, and the like," he said,
Asian Investment
Concerning American businesses in Japan, Mansfield said that Japan and East Asian
area is the most profitable for direct manufacturing investment. The American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan has issued a report stating that return on investment is about 18 percent
in Japan, the highest in the world.
Mansfield said that despite previous restrictions, the Japanese government is more
receptive to American investment "because they r ealize its values and 1 think the bars are
gradually being let down." But, at the same time, he warned American business not to
"come into Japan for the quick buck. They should come in for the long haul, carry out the
necessary feasibility studies and market surveys •• o be prepared to stay in • • • recognize
tho.t there might be losses in the beginning. "
He said that business looking for the quick profit "might just as well stay home."
A transcript of the interview with l\1ansfield appears on the following pages.
TRA!':SCRIPT ON BNA INTER VIEW
WITI-1 U.S. AMBASSADOR MICHAEL MANSFIELD
Q. In the past month or so, there have been more
comments, particularly from the commerce secretary
and U.S. Trade Representative Brock that the Japanese
markets are closed. It seems there is pressure from the
Reagan Administration to "open" the markets and I'd like
to know what you think is happening on that account since
I thought we had settled the issue that the Japanese markets weren't all that closed. Do you think the rna rkets
are closed or that this is political pressure?
A. I think the Japanese market is more open than
we realiZe and ours is not as open as we think. It's true
that there are invisible barriers , since quotas are still
maintained, mostly on agricultural products, but it's my
understanding that aU those quotas on agriculture and
fisheries amounts to only half a billion dollars over five
years. I've discussed this matter with the agricultural
attache and that's the source of that estimate.
One big door that was closed was NTT, but on the
basis of the agreement reached last December that door
is gradually being opened . In my opinion. an honest and
straightforward attempt is being made by that agency to
open it as much as possible in r.'Je months and vears
ahead. The U.S. market i s not as open as some of us.
think because we've entered into orderl y marketing agreements which tend to cut off s hipr.1ents to an extent or ro

realign them in such a way that they must conform to our
standards. I refer, for example, in the first instance, to
textUes and color tvs. In the second, to the creation of a
tri gger or reference price system for steel imports based
on Japanese costs, I believe, worldwide. T11e auto agreement falls into neither <;ategor y because it was an oral
agreement between rwo governments under which the
Japanese accommodated themselves to our difficulties by
agreeing to reduce their exports 7. 7 or 7. 8 percent this
year below la s t year.
Pressures by the Administration are nothmg new.
It depends on how you define the word pressure. 1 would
say its a continuation of the policies of preceding Administrations. Concernin~t agricultura I and fishery products ,
I sh"Juld amplify my answer by stating that Japan i s far
and away our best agricultu ral customer. 1'\obodv' s even
a close second. In calendar 1978 they bought $5. ·3 billion
worth of agricultu.ra.l produc.ts from us. Last yea r the
figure was 56. 1 hillion. Th1s year we're hoping to hit
$7 billion. So the trend has been steady, signHicant and
upward year by year.
We hear calls that the Jaoanese should buy more
cirrus, beef, and grains . As a ;natter of fact, over half
of the agnculrural products which they ship into this
country is composed of grains . As far as meat is concerocd, the larest f1g-.1rc J',·e seen IS that the highest total
we've e:c-portcd fro_~ the L:r.iteJ States over a three-year
period IS roughly ;,;, thou sanJ metnc tons worldwide. And
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the Japanese did buy last year 33 thousand metric tons -more than half of the meat exports on a worldwide basis.
As far as citrus is concerned we have a lock on the market
here with California lemons - - roughly 100- 110 thousand
metric tons average over the last three years, We have a
lock on the grapefruit market -- most of which comes from
Florida, Arizona and Texas, but mostly Florida. That
mounts to somewhere between 130 thousand metric tons
and 140 thousand metric tons over the past three years.
We have been able since I've been out here to increase the
imports of oranges from 15, 000 metric tons a year up to
about 73- 75 thousand this year and I think next year it'll
hit 82 , 000 under the bilateral agreement. At that time, we
will renegotiate and hopefully we'll be able to increase our
orange shipments and our orange juice.
So in the past four years they've increased their
orange imports from us five times. That's not a bad record.
Q.

Is that as an adequate r esponse? Are you sat-

isfied wTth this record?

A. For the time being. We hope next year when
negotiations are reopened under mutual agreement that we
will be able to up orange shipments and up beef shipments.
I don't know ho\V we can up our grain shipments very much.
U. S. Barriers

Q. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman commented recently that the United States complains about
orange exports to Japan, but the United States won't import
Japanese mikan. Do you think that the United States
should r eciprocate by removing any of our own trade bar riers?
A. Yes, I think that ought to be gone into very
seriousiY, with that objective in mind, and uniess overriding reasons are forth coming. Mikans are shipped in to six states -- in the northwest, Washington, Idaho,
Montana, and Oregon; plus Alaska and Hawaii. The American orange industry does have some complaints that ought
to be gone into, and if the necessary corrections can be
made, we should create the possibility of an expanded
mikan market.
Incidentally, in Japan, more years than not they
have a surplus of mikans, which indicates more strongly
how much they accommodate themselves to our desire to
ship more oranges into Japan. When they entered into that
agreement in 1977 or 1978 on oranges and beef, they at the
same time ordered 20 percent of their orange trees cut
down. But they still have surplusses .
Q. Do you think the Administration i s attempting
to convince the U. S. pub! ic that Japan is the scapegoat
for our own trade problems?
A. No, I think it's a good continuing policy to try
and ship more agricultural products abroad. It's the
shining factor in our overall trade picture. For example,
while the figure was $6.1 bill ion in exports to Japan last
year , Japan shipped less than $100 million worth of agricultural products to the United States. 1l1at leaves about
$6 billion in the clear.
Q. Since the Reagan Adm inistration took over ,
what changes have you seen in policies toward Japan , if
any?
A. A desire to work out agreements not necessarily written, by means of which an accommodation can be
reached, to he lp us out of our difficulties, such as automobiles. The labor unions , the UAW, and the auto industry, wanted two things: Japanese investment in the
United States. Honda is investing $200 million in Ohio,
Nissan $500 million in Tennessee, and reduced sh ipmen ts
to the United States. They've done both, and in dotng so
they 've ca lmed the move for protectionist legislation, and
gained a little breathing space and acquired a little more
Copyright
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flexibility. But neither one will solve the auto issue, which
will have to be solved in Detroit, with cars which are
competitively priced, as good or almost as good in quality , good follow through service and with the appropriate
anti-pollution devices plus higher gasoline mileage.

Q: Do you think they'll be successful?
A: I think so, given enough time . That's one of the
reasons-the Reagan Administration was so desirous that
the Japanese do what they did this year to help gain a little
time, a little space, a little flexibility, for the U. S. auto
industry.
Bilateral Agreements

Q: When Arthur Dunkel, the director of GATT,
was here, he was quite critical of bilateral agreements
such as the voluntary auto restraints. He seemed to think
this was going to undermine the multilateral tr ade system.
A: I wouldn't agree with him because the American
market is, comparatively speaking, a lot more open
market than the European, with the possible exception of
Benelux. Among the major countries , Germany is the best
with a 14-percent import tax, whereas we have four percent.
The Italians have a very strict quota basis , the
French, also, plus they went to the extreme of holding
their cars in port , while others were kept offshore on
ships. The English have some restrict ions. The relationship between Japan and the United States is not only
spec ia l, but the differentials in the markets concerned
g ive us more in the way of asking the Japanese to do what
we suggest than it is for the Europeans until they open
their markets more.
Q: Do you see what is happening, with the autos
in particular now, as a trend toward protectionism?
A: In the United States, not at the moment.
Q: In the West, in general?
A· Yes.
Q: But not the United States?
A: No, b.n it's always latent in the United States.
It's always latent in any country, because it's natural to
protect your own industries as much as you can. Part of
our main job out here, as we see it, is to try and see
these economic difficulties coming up in time so we can
do what we can to prevent them from getting out of hand
and becoming an impo ssible political issue in which protectionist legislation would play a very important part.
Q: Let' s say we continue to have the scenario we
have now: the western economies are weak, they tend
to want to protect their own markets, Japan continues to
be sn·ong. If this continues, what will happen to U. S.Japan trade relations ?
A: We want to do our best to see that it doesn't
get out of hand. We have to anticipate difficulties from
time to time. After all, we are the two greatest industrial
democracies. The two-way trade between our two
countri es amounted to about $52 -53 billion last year and
it is growing all the time.
This is the most important bilateral relationship
in the world, and we ought to recognize that fact. I think
that that fact i s sinking home among the American people,
and in the American government.
Q: In trade relations with Japan we've gone
through\vaves of crises- - textiles , steel -- then we've
moved into autos , electronics. In the future, there may
be problems with high technology, integrated circuits,
services. Do you think we' re going to see the same
kinds of Japanese, "overexporting."
A: Yes. Yes. We have to expect it. I wouldn't
say "overexporting, " though. After all, Japan is a
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vulnerable country in more ways than you can shake a
stick at. It's earthquake prone. It ' s economically very
poorly off as far as natural resources are concerned. It
has to import raw materials to manufacture to export to
survive , to take care of a population of 117 million
people , in a count ry whi ch is 3 , 000 square miles smaller
than my own state of Montana .
Strategica lly, they are located in the midst of one
of the most i mportant areas of the world - - the PRC, the
Sovi et Union, the United States and Japan, with Korea ,
also. So they have to make do with what they haven't got
in the way of natural resources by importing. What they
have got i s human r esources , with productivity, drive,
creation of competitively priced quality products for which
they achieve a reputation and for which there's a demand.
Semiconductors, Computers

(ITIM)

8-12-81

a go of it and realize that the returns on their investments
are excellent and hopefully more would come and invest
and participate as we want Japanese to come and invest
and participate in our market.

Q. Will Japanese government officials be receptive
to that?A. They are receptive to American investment
from the United States because they realize its values . The
bars are gradually being let down to encourage more
American investment here . The Japanese have said pub li cly they would like more American business to come to
Japan.
Q. What mistakes do you think American business men are making in Japan?
A. It's a littl e hard for me to give you a ll the
anS\ver~ One thing American business shou~d not do is
to come into Japan for the quick buck. They should come
i n for the long haul, carry out the necessary feas ibility
studies and market surveys, as the Japanese do, recognize
that even the Japanese sometimes suffer a loss , be prepared to stay in , build up towards steady profits , recognize
that there might be losses in the beginning. But do not
co171e in for the quick buck because those people might
just as well stay at home .

Q: But you do see problems in the future?
A: Yes, in semiconductors, high technology, and
computers . Twas talking to some people from the semiconductor industry. They said they had 60 percent of the
market worldwide . Last year, our shipments of semicon ductors into Japan exceeded those of Japan into the United
States . This year so far it's so-so roughly. But we still
have the lead . It's up to us to spend enough on research
and development to make sure that we maintain that lead.
Japanese imports
But I notice already that when it comes to chips , outfits like
Hewlett Packard , Texas Instruments and others are buying
Q . MITI has announced a policy for increasing
their chips from the Japanese because they are dependable,
imports-;- particularly from Europe, what will be the
and of a better quality . Now I think it's shifting and we're
effects of the United States?
doing a better job, and we'll have to do it to keep the
A. As the dollar becomes stronger, what we sell
Japanese from coming up too fast .
becomes more expensive. There has been a steady increase
We can do it if we will, but we can take nothlilg
over the last three years in manufactured imports. There
for granted. We ' ve got to spend enough on research
was a 22 percent increase over the previous year three
and development to make sure that that lead is mainyears ago; two years ago it was up 36 percent; last year ,
tained.
it was around 16 percent over the year before . And this
year, for the first half, I think the figures indicate about
Q. Are there any talks or negotiations going on
a 7 percent increase for the first six months over the first
now to head off this problem?
six months of last year.
A. Yes . There are Japanese compani es investThere has been a large continuing increase. The
ing in the United States. There are American concerns
Japanese are interested in quality . For good things they'll
investing more over here. TI, I believe , is doing that;
pay the price, but they won' t buy shoddy goods .
Motorola and probably others . That ' s the way things
ought to develop because we do have to work c losely
Q . Were you part of the talks leading up to this
with each other.
announcement and what were the reasons behind it?
We hope we can work out an agreement -- and the
A. We've always urged them to increase imports ;
prospects look good - - whereby the Japanese will reduce
Brock, the U. S. Trade Representative, has urged them ;
their import duty on semiconductors to 4 . 2 percent, and
Baldrige and others have urged them to buy more American
we lik ewise will reduce our present import duty to the
products. And they are . But, of course, we have a wide
same figure .
divergence in the trade picture . Last year it was $9. 9
billion in Japan' s favor. This year it' s going to be larger,
Q. Do you see a trend toward Japanese direct
based on the first six months figure , if this trend continues .
investment in the United States in particular?
When we look at those figures at home we begin to
A, Yes, I mentioned Honda and Nissan . Sony
get concerned . But you have to look at the whole trade
has direct investments in the U. S. Hitachi. I think
picture and not just the segments which individually make
that's increasing, though the direct investment lags
up the whole . Whereas we had a $9. 9 billion deficit with
behind that of Canada, the Netherlands , United Kingdom ,
japan la s t year, we had a $1 7. 2 billion surplus with the
and a few more other countries .
EC last year , and with all of Western Europe about a
$21 . 2 billion surplus.
Q. The American Chamber of Commerce in
Q. Is this Japanese import policy the result of
Japan figures show that American manufacturing invest pressure from the United States?
ment in Japan has the highest return on investment in
A. I wouldn't say pressure . Suggestions . Talks.
the world, about 18 percent. They are encouraging more
companies to invest here . Do you agree with that and is
9_. There was criticism during the auto talks that
the American embassy encouraging American companies
the resistance of the japanese auto indust1·y to the reto invest here?
A. I would say with Japan and East Asia , you get
stra int program indi cated a new resistance among Japathe biggest returns on investments ove r the past years
ne se industry to settling trade problems in that way and
of any region in the world, American investment in
that thi s is a changing attitude among the japanese. This
Japan is about $S . 8 billion, and in the rest of East A:;ia
kind of res istance never would have happened in the ilast
$20,8 billion . Am ericans who come over here to l ook
with the steel industry, for example. Do yo u think there ' s
at Japanese indust ry ought to look at what American
more of an attitude of resistance in the Japanese private
industry is doing over here, find out how they can make
sector?
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A. Yes. I think t he japanese industry in that respeer is"Dcginning to compare somewhat wi th ours. After
all , the pr ivate sector is based on a capitalistic economy
as ours is, T hey don' t depend on the government nearly
as much as they used to for financ ing , g uidance , and the
li ke. T hey were not at all happy that thi s accommodation
was worked out. T her e was a li m ited amount of guidance
from the government. The government had expressed its
opinion quite vigorously for t he past several years and the
auto i ndustr y rei uctantly came along.
The auto industry , the private sector in gener al ,
i s in much better shape financially than is the government
of Japan which for the past two years ha s been oper ating
at more than a third of its national budget in de flcit , and
for next· year will be about 28 percent or 29 per cent in deficit. T hey have their troubles. T hey have an internal
debt that i s increasing at an astronom ical rate .

Q. What do you think tha t means for the fut ure of
the japan ese economy and its abili ty to grow?
!::_. They have no cho ice . 111e Japanese will try
to s tay ahead of t he fie l d. T hey will go mor e a nd more

(No . 90)

into high tecllnology . It's an indicat ion of their vulner a bility that the y have to look ahead as far as they do in or der to remain afloat.

.
S{. What do you t h ink about the criticism of the
U . S. high interes t rate policy, that was discussed at the
Ottawa talks . Is it creati ng a problem here in japan?
A. 1l1ey are concer ned about it, But it ' s a prob l em thatthe Japanese seem to be able to surmount.
They've been able to cope with it. It's the Eur opean s who
seem to be the most worried about interest rates, But
what the E uropeans and the japanese ought to r emember
is that we're worried about high interest rates , too, and
the effect it has on auto sales and home construction. The
purpose behind the high interest rates is to curb inflation,
and evidently that part seems to be working.
Q. In japan, you don't see any significant com plaint or pressure?
A. I don ' t see it. T hey are cancer ned but they
are understanding.

-- End of Section B --
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